We address the implied volatility smile of the S&P 500 index options before and after the October 1987 crash. In a single-period model, the cross sections of one-month calls and puts violate stochastic dominance even with realistic bid-ask spreads and transaction costs on the options and the index (SPDRs). The violations are frequent even prior to the crash, in contrast to the extant literature that considers the post-crash pronounced smile to be the primary challenge to economic theory. In a multiperiod model, the restrictions on prices that prevent stochastic dominance are less stringent, yet violations of stochastic dominance persist both before and after the crash. 
Introduction and Summary
A robust prediction of the celebrated Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973) (BSM) option pricing model is that the volatility implied by market prices of options is constant across striking prices. Rubinstein (1994) tested this prediction on the S&P 500 index options traded on the Chicago Board Options Exchange, an exchange that comes close to the dynamically complete and perfect market assumptions underlying the BSM model. As a function of the strike price, the implied volatility is flat from the start of the exchange-based trading in April 1986 until the October 1987 stock market crash. Thereafter, it is downward-sloping, a pattern referred to as the "volatility smile" that is also observed in international markets and to a lesser extent on individual-stock options.
1 Ait-Sahalia and Lo (1998) and Jackwerth and Rubinstein (1996) , among others, refined the result by estimating the risk-neutral stock price distribution from the cross section of option prices. Jackwerth and Rubinstein (1996) confirmed that, prior to the October 1987 crash, the risk-neutral stock price distribution is close to lognormal, consistent with flat implied volatility. Thereafter, the distribution is systematically skewed to the left, consistent with downward-sloping implied volatility.
These findings raise several important questions. Does the BSM model work well prior to the crash? If it does, is it because the risk-neutral probability of a stock market crash was low and consistent with a lognormal distribution? Or, is it because the risk-neutral probability of a stock market crash was erroneously perceived to be low by the market participants? Why does the model fail after the crash? Is it because the risk neutral probability of a stock market crash increased after the crash and became inconsistent with a lognormal distribution? Or, is it because the risk neutral probability of a stock market crash was erroneously perceived to do so? These are some of the questions that we address in this paper.
The state-price density, also known as the pricing kernel, stochastic discount factor, or the representative agent's marginal rate of substitution, plays a central role in our study. It links the real, or subjective, probability distribution with the risk-neutral probability distribution of the index price.
Whereas a downward sloping implied volatility is inconsistent with the BSM model, it is important to realize that this pattern is not inconsistent with economic theory in general. Two fundamental assumptions of the BSM model are that the market is frictionless and dynamically complete. We empirically investigate whether the observed time series of the index returns from 1928 to 1995 and of the cross section of S&P 500 index option prices are consistent with various economic models that explicitly recognize trading costs and bid-ask spreads and also allow for a dynamically incomplete market.
Both frictions and dynamic incompleteness have rather drastic consequences for option pricing. In both cases arbitrage methods alone are incapable of producing a unique option price. Market incompleteness is generally handled either by using general equilibrium relations to complete the market 2 , or by deriving bounds within which the option price lies, along the lines explored in this paper.
Bounds containing the option price also arise when there are transaction costs, the main source of frictions.
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Our point of departure from earlier related work by Ait-Sahalia and Lo (2000) and Jackwerth (2000) is the allowance for intermediate trading over the lifetime of the options and the recognition of transaction costs.
We avoid any a priori assumptions about the form of the real distribution of the S&P 500 index returns and use histograms extracted from two different data samples as estimates of that distribution. One sample, termed the historical sample, is based on index returns in the pre-crash period , while another sample, the forward-looking sample, contains mostly post-crash data (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) .
Based on the distributions extracted from these samples we construct option market models that relax sequentially the two assumptions of the absence of transaction costs and lack of intermediate trading of the earlier studies.
We start with a one-period incomplete market into which we introduce transaction costs. It turns out that each one of these two complications changes substantially the theoretical restrictions and the empirical findings.
Market incompleteness even in a single period model is by itself sufficient to produce a smile on theoretical grounds, while transaction costs widen the range of allowable option prices. These conclusions are confirmed when intermediate trading is allowed. Further, the consistency of the model predictions with the observed option prices is crucially dependent on the sample used for the estimation of the range of allowable option prices. The distribution extracted from the historical sample makes the pre-crash option prices consistent, and the post-crash observations inconsistent with the theoretical predictions; the distribution corresponding to the forward-looking sample exactly reverses these findings in all cases examined in our empirical work. We interpret this result as the existence of a learning effect for the option investor, whose market behavior shifts away from the BSM model in the post-crash period.
We begin with a single-period model of a perfect market. The beginning of the period is the observation date of the option prices and the end of the period is the common expiration date of the options. Absence of arbitrage is equivalent to the existence of a strictly positive pricing kernel. This, in turn, implies the familiar static no-arbitrage restrictions on the prices of options. Predictably, we find no violations of these restrictions, once we suitably filter the data. Equivalently, the pricing kernel implied by the observed cross section of option prices and the time series of index returns is found to be strictly positive.
With some commonly employed and plausible assumptions, the single-period economic model further restricts the pricing kernel to be a decreasing function of the index price, as pointed out by Rubinstein (1976) . Perrakis and Ryan (1984) , Levy (1985) , and Ritchken (1985) were the first to exploit this restriction and derive upper and lower bounds on the prices of options. 4 Violation of these bounds implies that any investor endowed with increasing and concave von Neumann-Morgenstern utility can increase her expected utility by judiciously trading in the index, the risk free money-market account, and the said option. These bounds are oftentimes referred to as single-period stochastic-dominance bounds because their violation implies that any investor may trade in the index, the risk free bond, and the said option and generate a wealth distribution that second-order stochastically dominates her wealth distribution prior to the trade.
We estimate these bounds with assumed distributions of the index return at the end of the period drawn from the histograms of the historical and the forwardlooking data samples. We find that the bounds estimates based on the historical sample contain the observed option quotes for the pre-crash and early post-crash years, but that they violate the bounds strongly during the later years in our sample. These results are consistent with the conclusions of Jackwerth (2000), who
found that the pricing kernel implied by the observed cross section of prices of S&P 500 index options is everywhere decreasing prior to the October 1987 crash but that widespread violations are observed thereafter. Our findings are, however, exactly reversed when the forward-looking sample is used for the bounds estimates.
We then investigate whether we may reconcile the single-period stochasticdominance model with the data by recognizing realistic proportional transaction costs in trading the index. The relaxation of the bounds is only slight because we only trade once and the empirical results remain essentially unchanged.
We may tighten the above bounds by simultaneously testing them on the entire cross section of available options, as in Lo (2000), Jackwerth (2000) and Ryan (2000 Ryan ( , 2003 .
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In our empirical work the assumption of a decreasing pricing kernel is built into the estimation of the allowable option prices (the bounds): the absence of a decreasing kernel consistent with the data corresponds to option prices that violate the bounds. We test for the existence of a decreasing pricing kernel by introducing additional constraints in the estimation of the bounds of the single period problem. First we require that each option in our cross-section of observations be priced consistently with the price of the nearest-the-money option of the sample, by introducing the observed price of that option as a constraint in the estimation of the bounds. Then we introduce the prices of the entire cross-section of available options as constraints and examine the feasibility of the estimation of the bounds of an additional option. In both cases, the Jackwerth (2000) results, that a decreasing kernel exists pre-crash but not post-crash, are confirmed for the historical sample. The effect is, however, exactly reversed when the bounds are estimated with the forward-looking sample.
As Perrakis (1986) and Ritchken and Kuo (1988) . Violation of these bounds implies that any investor endowed with increasing and concave von Neumann-Morgenstern utility can increase her expected utility by judiciously trading in the index, the risk free money-market account and the said option. In the absence of transaction costs these bounds turn out to be much tighter than the bounds earlier obtained under the assumption that intermediate trading is prohibited, and they can be shown to converge to a single option price at the limit of continuous trading in a dynamically complete market.
Whereas transaction costs cause but a minor relaxation of the bounds of option prices in a single-period model, they cause a major relaxation of the bounds in a model that allows for intermediate trading. Constantinides and Perrakis (2002) derived stochastic dominance bounds on option prices in the presence of transaction costs.
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These bounds are substantially weaker than the earlier bounds.
We tighten the above bounds by simultaneously testing them on the entire cross section of available options.
We test the multiperiod bounds under transaction costs estimated from the distributions extracted from our two different data samples and confirm the results of all our previous tests. Even though the bounds are weaker now, the bounds 
We assume that the trader pays ( in cash when purchasing one ex dividend share of the index and is credited ( in cash when selling (or, selling short) one share of the index, where . The assertion that the pricing kernel supports the index price is stated as
We assume that the trader pays 
Thus absence of arbitrage implies the existence of a strictly positive pricing kernel,
, that satisfies the pricing constraints (1)-(3) and the positivity constraint
Note that the normalized product π , or, equivalently, , is the risk-neutral or risk-adjusted probability.
In the absence of transaction costs, k k , violations of the constraints
(1)-(4) in this static, one-period model are violations of the Merton (1973) noarbitrage restrictions, namely the European put-call parity and the monotonicity and convexity of the option price as a function of the strike price. In the empirical part of the paper, we filter out the few option prices that violate these restrictions according to the procedure described in Jackwerth and Rubinstein (1996 , pp. 1617 -1620 . Since in our filtered data set there exists, by construction, a strictly positive pricing kernel that satisfies the pricing constraints (1)- (3) with zero transaction costs, the same pricing kernel also satisfies the pricing constraints (1)- (3) with positive transaction costs. Therefore, it is redundant to test for the existence of such a kernel in our filtered sample.
We now tighten the restrictions imposed on observed option prices by introducing restrictions that rule out stochastic dominance. Ruling out stochastic dominance means that there exists at least one investor with increasing and concave utility that supports the observed prices. If we cannot rule out stochastic dominance, then any investor with increasing and concave utility can improve her expected utility through trading.
Suppose, for the moment, that we can observe an investor's marginal utility at the end of the period, state-by-state. We order the states in decreasing order of the investor's marginal utility, and seek a pricing kernel that satisfies the pricing constraints (1)-(3), the positivity constraint and the monotonicity constraint 1 2
We need to identify an observable variable that is strictly monotone in an Therefore, we may order the states in increasing value of the market index at the end of the period and test for stochastic dominance.
Suppose that there exists at least one investor satisfying assumptions (i)-(iv).
If the set of restrictions (1)- (3) and (5) is infeasible, it can be shown that the set of option prices do not support an equilibrium: the investor can buy a negative-cost portfolio net of transaction costs (that is, have a net cash inflow at the beginning of the period) and increase her expected utility at the end of the period.
We emphasize that the restriction on option prices imposed by the criterion of the absence of stochastic dominance is motivated by the economically plausible assumption that there exists at least one investor satisfying assumptions (i)-(iv).
This is a substantially weaker assumption than requiring that all investors satisfy assumptions (i)-(iv). Stochastic dominance then implies that at least one investor,
but not necessarily all investors, increases her expected utility by trading in the option.
We also emphasize that the restriction of the absence of stochastic dominance is weaker than the restriction that the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) holds. The CAPM requires that the pricing kernel be linearly decreasing in the index price. The absence of stochastic dominance merely imposes that the pricing kernel be monotone decreasing in the index price.
In Section 4, we report the results of testing for the set of restrictions (1)- (3) and (5) and special cases thereof. A useful way of pinpointing the options that cause infeasibility or near-infeasibility of the problem is to single out a "test" option with payoff in state i and solve the following problem:
( )
and 1 2
If this problem is feasible, then the attained maximum and minimum have the following interpretation. If one can buy the test option, net of transaction costs, for less than the minimum attained in this problem, then there is stochastic dominance:
at least one investor, but not necessarily all investors, increases her expected utility by trading the test option. Likewise, if one can write the test option, net of transaction costs, for more than the maximum attained in this problem, then again there is stochastic dominance. In Section 4, we numerically solve the linear program (6)-(10) using the simplex algorithm and report the results for two special cases. In the first special case, J , the constraints (7)-(10) are imposed only on the risk free rate and the index. In the second case, J , the constraints (7)- (10) are imposed on the risk free rate, the index and one option, chosen to be the nearest-the-money call. Perrakis and Ryan (1984) , Levy (1985) , Ritchken (1985) , and Ryan (2000) were the first to derive upper and lower bounds on the prices of European options in this case and under the assumption of zero transaction costs.
In the next major step towards realism, we allow for intermediate trading, relaxing the implausible assumption of the single-period model that markets for trading are open only at the initial trading date and at the common expiration date of the options.
Recall that the single-period stochastic-dominance model implies that the pricing kernel is a decreasing function of the index price at the end of the period, once some plausible assumptions are introduced. Constantinides and Zariphopoulou (1999) In the multiperiod model, we consider, as before, a market with two types of primary financial assets: a riskless bond and a stock. We assume that there is a class of traders in the market that we refer to as utility-maximizing traders. We do not make the restrictive assumption that all traders belong to the class of utilitymaximizing traders. Thus our results are unaffected by the presence of traders with different objectives and preferences and facing a different transaction costs schedule than that of the utility-maximizing traders. Below we refer to the utilitymaximizing traders simply as "traders".
Each trader makes sequential investment decisions in the primary assets at the discrete trading dates t , where T is the terminal date and is finite.
A trader may hold long or short positions in these assets. A bond with price one at date t has constant price R at date t+1. The bond trades do not incur transaction costs. At date t, the cum dividend stock price is ( ) The results extend routinely to the case that consumption occurs at each trading date and utility is defined over consumption at each of the trading dates and over the net worth at the terminal date. See, Constantinides (1979) for details. The model with utility defined over terminal net worth alone is a more realistic representation of the objective function of a financial make the plausible assumption that the utility function, u ( ) ⋅ , is increasing and concave, and is defined for both positive and negative terminal net worth.
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We define the value function recursively as
We assume that the parameters satisfy appropriate technical conditions such that the value function exists and is once differentiable. As proven in Constantinides (1979) , the value function V x is increasing and concave in ( , properties inherited from the monotonicity and concavity of the utility function u , given that the transaction costs are quasi-linear:
.., '
institution.
11 If utility is defined only for non-negative net worth, then the decision variable is constrained to be a member of a convex set, A, that ensures the non-negativity of the net worth. See, Constantinides (1979) for details. However, the derivation of bounds on the prices of derivatives requires an entirely different approach and yields weaker bounds. This case is studied in Constantinides and Zariphopoulou (1999, 2001 ).
Marginal analysis leads to the following restrictions for the bond price 
Denote by P and P the time-zero bid and ask prices, net of transaction costs, of options with cash payoff
. Then marginal analysis leads to the following restrictions on the option prices:
In Section 4, we report the results of testing for the feasibility of the set of restrictions (3.5)-(3.10) for t . A useful way to pinpoint the options that cause infeasibility or near-infeasibility of the problem is to single out a "test" option, say the J th option and solve the problem 1,2,...,
, , max min , ,0
subject to the set of restrictions (3.5)-(3.10).
We also test for the multiperiod bounds on the price of an option derived by Constantinides and Perrakis (2004) . These bounds are the special case of the above problem for J but are computationally more tractable than the above fullfledged problem. We assume that the minimum index return per period, , 1 = min R is bounded away from zero. We assume that , where R is defined as the unconditional mean of the index return. We define
. For 0 k = , an upper bound on the reservation write price of a call option is given recursively as follows:
In the special case R , the bound simplifies into
The corresponding lower bound on the call price is
with R defined implicitly by ( ) ( ) Whereas transaction costs cause but a minor relaxation of the lower put and the upper call bounds on option prices in a single-period model, they cause a major relaxation of all bounds in a model that allows for intermediate trading. Constantinides and Perrakis (2002) derived stochastic dominance bounds on option prices in the presence of transaction costs. Some of these bounds are independent of the partition of the interval to option expiration. We present these first, even though they may not be the tightest possible bounds for any given frequency of trading.
At any time t prior to expiration, the following is an upper bound on the price of a call:
This bound is independent of the frequency of trading. Furthermore, it is the tightest possible call option upper bound under transaction costs for "reasonable"
values of the parameters. Indeed, while a recursive expression for the upper call bound similar to (3.12) may be shown to hold with (1 ) (1 )
would then have S < R in most cases, thus rendering the parameter α in (3.12) negative and making the resulting bound inferior to (16).
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Put option upper and lower bounds also exist that are independent of the frequency of trading. They are given by
where 13 See Perrakis (1993) .
A partition-independent lower bound for a call option can also be found, but only if it is additionally assumed that there exists at least one trader for whom the investment horizon coincides with the option expiration time T. In such a case, transaction costs become irrelevant and put-call parity implies
A put option upper bound that depends on the frequency of trading but is in many cases and for reasonable parameter values tighter than (3.18) is the following: 
Empirical Results
We use the historical daily record of the S&P 500 index and its daily dividend record over the period 1928-1995. The monthly index return is based on 30 calendar day (21 trading day) returns. In order to avoid difficulties with the estimated historical mean of the returns, we demean all our samples and reintroduce a mean 4% annualized premium over the risk free rate. The distribution of the index is extracted from two alternative samples of thirty-day index returns: the historical sample uses returns over the period 1928-1985; the forward-looking sample uses the returns over the period 1986-1995. We use the historical sample as our base case and present the results of the forward-looking sample only when the two differ significantly.
For the S&P 500 index options we use the tick-by-tick Berkeley Options
Database of all quotes and trades over the years 1986-1995. For 108 months we retain only the call option quotes for the day corresponding to options thirty days to expiration.
14 For each day retained in the sample, we aggregate the quotes to the minute and pick the minute with the most quotes as our cross-section for the month. We present these quotes in terms of their bid and ask implied volatilities. These are the volatilities which would be needed in the Black-Scholes formula to price the option exactly at the bid or ask quote, respectively. Details on the databases can be found in the appendix, in Jackwerth and Rubinstein (1996) , and in Jackwerth (2000).
In our empirical work, we essentially check whether the bid and ask option Table 1 and panels A to D in each figure of this section.
We begin by addressing the feasibility of the set of constraints (1)- (3), which insure the correct pricing of the bond, the index, and the options, and (5), which prevents stochastic dominance, over the entire cross section of 30-day options. Recall that, if the set of constraints is infeasible, then there is stochastic dominance. The number of options in each monthly cross section fluctuates between 3 and 34 with a median of 10. Table 1 displays the percentage of months in which stochastic dominance is absent in the cross section of option prices. The transaction cost rate (one-way trading fees plus half the bid-ask spread) on the index is 0.5%. The transaction cost rate (one-way trading fees plus half the bid-ask spread) on each option is about 75c (or, 38c for the numbers in parentheses). In the second row, the index returns are the historic ones for the sample period 1928-1985, with the mean premium of the index return over the risk free return adjusted to be 4% annually. In the third row, the index returns are for the sample period 1986-1995, again with the mean premium of the index return over the risk free return adjusted to be 4% annually.
Table 1. Percentage of Months with Stochastic Dominance Violations
The an investor can improve her utility by trading in these assets without investing any money into her portfolio. The pattern of violations differs considerably when using the historical index sample as opposed to using the forward-looking sample.
Using the historical sample, more violations occur in the post crash period, consistent with the evidence in Jackwerth (2000) who finds that the estimated pricing kernel is monotonically decreasing in the pre crash period, but that they are locally increasing during the post crash period. 15 Using the forward-looking sample, the pattern reverses itself and there are now much more stochastic dominance violations in the pre crash period than in the post crash period. We will discuss this reversal in greater detail as it is a predominant feature of all our results.
The lower and upper bounds are estimated separately for call and put (6) to (10) Thus pricing seems to be more in line with the forward-looking sample during the last two subperiods. In Figure 3 , we estimate the single-period bounds with a generous transaction cost rate of 0.5% in equation (8) The investor learning effect is also preserved when the entire set of constraints (9) for all observed options, with the same transaction costs for the option of 0.2% of the stock price, are added to the programming problem of the single period bounds. In the results (not shown) comparable to Figures 4 and 5, the infeasibility cases are few during the pre-crash period for the historical sample, but they rise sharply in the post-crash period, reaching to more than 90% of the observations for the latest period. The pattern is exactly reversed when the forward-looking sample is used, with only 11% feasible cases for the pre-crash sample and more than 60% feasibility in the two late post-crash periods. For these last periods the feasible observations lie within the very tight bounds for the forward-looking sample, while they violate the bounds in the historical sample.
For the multiperiod case, the estimation of the recursive call and put bounds from expressions (11) to (15) when there are no transaction costs produce very tight bounds (not shown here) with both the historical and the forward-looking sample.
In the last two Figures 6 and 7 of this section, we present the multiperiod bounds of Section 3, computed from (16)- (20) with transaction costs for the index k = 0.5%, respectively for the historical and the forward-looking samples. We note that the put upper bound given by (17) is very loose and is never violated by observed option prices. The recursive bound of (21)- (22) may be expected to tighten the multiperiod put upper bound if the trading is not too frequent. 
Concluding Remarks
In our investigation of the stochastic dominance in the S&P 500 index option market, we find several severe violations of stochastic dominance when we consider all assets simultaneously. That means that a trader can improve her utility from trading in a portfolio of the bond, the index, and the index options without investing any additional money. This result holds even under generous transactions costs and allowing trading at multiple periods during the life of the options. Furthermore, the findings are independent of the use of a historical index sample as opposed to a forward-looking sample (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) .
We document in detail that the pattern of violations changes with the index sample: the historical sample generates less violations pre-crash and in the first subperiod after the crash and more violations in the later two subperiods of the postcrash period. The forward-looking sample generates exactly the opposite pattern.
We associate this change with investor learning from the crash of 1987: they change the index sample which they use for option pricing some time after the crash from the historical to the forward-looking sample.
We also investigate less demanding scenarios where we only require the stock and the bond to be priced correctly. Without transaction costs, we mainly find violations of the option pricing bounds based on the historical sample in the pre-crash and the first post-crash period. For the bounds based on the forward-looking sample, we mainly find violations in the last two post-crash periods. The results weaken naturally somewhat when we introduce transaction costs on the stock. They tighten somewhat when we require the nearest-the-money option to be priced correctly, too. Allowing for multiperiod trading weakens the bounds again.
However, none of these alternative scenarios fundamentally changes the basic findings.
In future work, we plan to refine the multiperiod bounds to the recursive bounds of Constantinides and Perrakis (2002) . Furthermore, we have so far not imposed any restrictions on the shape of the pricing kernel beyond monotonicity.
We do feel however strongly that any reasonable pricing kernel not be too erratic.
To operationalize this concept, we would like to investigate bounds on the elasticity or the variability of the pricing kernel along the lines of Bernardo and Ledoit (2000) and Cochrane and Saa-Requejo (2000) .
The empirical tests are based on a database containing all minute-by-minute
European option quotes and trades on the S&P500 index from April 2, 1986 to December 29, 1995. We use only option quotes since we cannot know for actual trades where they occurred relative to the bid/ask spread and our results might be affected. The database also contains all futures trades and quotes on the S&P 500.
Our goal is to obtain a panel of daily return observations on the index, the risk-free rate, and on several options with different strike price/index level ratios (moneyness) and constant maturity. 
where F is the futures price at option expiration.
For each day, we use the median interest rate implied by all futures quotes and trades and the index level at that time. We approximate the dividend yield by assuming that the dividend amount and timing expected by the market were identical to the dividends actually paid on the S&P 500 index. However, some limited tests indicate that the choice of the index does not seem to affect the results of this paper.
Interest Rates. We compute implied interest rates embedded in the European put-call parity relation. Armed with option quotes, we calculate separate lending and borrowing interest returns from put-call parity where we used the above future-based index. We assign, for each expiration date, a single lending and borrowing rate to each day, which is the median of all daily observations across all striking prices. We then use the average of those two interest rates as our daily spot rate for the particular time-to-expiration. Finally, we obtain the interpolated interest rates from the implied forward curve. If there is data missing, we assume that the spot rate curve can be extrapolated horizontally for the shorter and longer times-to-expiration. Again, some limited tests indicate that the results are not affected by the exact choice of the interest rate.
Options with adjusted moneyness and constant maturity. It is important to use options with adjusted moneyness and constant maturity since our test statistics involve the conditional covariance matrix of option pricing errors. If the maturity of the options were not constant over time, then the conditional covariance matrix of the pricing errors would be time varying, too. This would require additional exogenous assumptions on the structure of the covariance matrix and the estimation of several additional parameters, which could lead to additional estimation error in our test statistics.
In our data set, all puts are translated into calls using European put-call parity. Then, we compute the implied volatilities where we use the Black-Scholes formula as a translation device only. We then adjust throughout each day for the movement of the stock price by assuming that the implied volatilities are independent of the underlying stock price. Then, we pick the stock price closest to 12 pm as our daily stock price and value all options from throughout the day as if they were call options with the implied volatilities measured above and struck at the moneyness level measured above. We do not eliminate any daily observations due to their level of moneyness.
Arbitrage Violations. In the process of setting up the database, we check for a number of errors, which might have been contained in the original minute-byminute transaction level data. We eliminate a few obvious data-entry errors as well as a few quotes with excessive spreads-more than 200 cents for options and 20 cents for futures. General arbitrage violations are eliminated from the data set. We also check for violations of vertical and butterfly spreads. Within each minute we keep the largest set of option quotes which does not violate:
(1 ) max[0, (1 ) ]
American early exercise is not an issue as the S&P 500 options are European in nature, and the discreteness of quotes and trades only introduces a stronger upward bias in the midpoint implied volatilities for deep-out-of-the-money puts (moneyness less than 0.6) which we do not use in our empirical work.
